guage study, for the schematizations make conveniently available the distinctive variations of theory which inform them. They serve as a conceptual shorthand. But like any "model," they are not "real." They do not even represent something which is claimed to be "real." They act as categorical or hypothetical promises; they function as Pirandello-like representations of representations, images of constructs of propositions about reality. As George Lakoff and Henry Thompson admit, "abstract grammars do not have any separate reality; they are just convenient fictions for representing certain processing strategies.'"2
One could argue that they are necessary fictions as well. Without the illustrative property, without the all-at-onceness of the diagrams in early transformationalgenerative publications, the theory of deep structure might have exerted less revolutionary power during its relatively short period of influence on linguistic research. Following that early lead, post-Chomskian linguists have reinforced their verbal metaphors of "deep structure" by providing graphic schemes to accompany their discussions. The advantage of such models lies in their exploitation of human cognition and memory (paradoxically, the very thing the models, in part, describe). Try defining "deep structure"; now try illustrating the same concept. All things being equal, the second task will be the easier, or at least it will "give shape" to the verbal definition. The mental image of the "grammar" gives us a handle on the wider outlines of the linguistic philosophy.
Though literary scholars and rhetoricians take for granted the merits of imagistic thought, we generally mean by that verbal images-the metonymic wordplay in the literature which we study, the "examples" and "specificities" which we encourage in the writing of our students. By definition, disciplines within the humanities are oriented toward human language, and, generally speaking, the more abstract any form of communication becomes, the more it shifts into forms alien to us. Diagrams, schemata, formulas, charts, heuristics, computer programs, all representations of language (of our reality) tend to disarm us. We get defensive. We back off. My guess is that, aside from the obviously manifest inclination of humanists to deal with words rather than another symbolic system, many of us timidly back away from linguistic models because we see them as ugly and simplistic geometries of a fascinatingly beautiful and complex world, human speech-making. Many of us have, in effect, confused the map with the territory.
There is a lesson to be learned, if we grant the above, for those involved in language research outside the conventional disciplines of pure and applied linguistics. For those of us who teach traditional English department courses in literary criticism and composition (reading and writing), the lesson is crucial if we further grant that both are exercises in the processing of language. Except for a very few who have not been intimidated by the highly visible models of contemporary linguistic theory, we have not overcome or even acknowledged our reluctance to over- stein Smith are among the handful of critics exploring the correlations between a theory of language and a theory of reading.3 But most of us, in fact, have not accommodated the prevailing philosophy of language to our own endeavors in the comprehension and production of "texts." This despite the fact that most of us "grant" the validity of post-Chomskian theory.
As a result, much of our research in composition goes over the same ground year after year. Our new theories amount to an updating of the old with the result that new strategies based on the research in linguistics-sentence combining, perhaps, or tagmemic aids to invention-find no philosophical coherence with the traditional approaches to teaching rhetoric--the study of style and arrangement or practice in the topics and logic. In our role as pedagogues and practical researchers, we have taken on the vocabulary of post-Chomskian thought without taking on the thought. No wonder that the classical scholar stares in amazement at much of the "modern" theory in composition and dubs it "just Aristotle in new trappings." We have taken what seems to square with traditional concepts only to talk piecemeal, finally, about the broadest considerations, the whole of rhetoric and the whole in it. And our "research designs" prove it. By and large, we ignore the deductive paradigm of modern language inquiry; our inductive activity induces no principle to guide it. And this is all the more frustrating when we consider that most of us, as I posited above, do subscribe to the governing rule of modern linguistics, that any user of language-and that must include the writer as well as the speaker or the readeroperates in two dimensions simultaneously, the surface representation and the underlying form.
Rhetorical theory, simply put, desperately needs a model of the holistic activity which is its subject, a set of coherent assumptions about the process of composing which finds broad definition and easy reference in a symbolic map of the territory. Such a model should be tested, in whole or in part, amended, refined, adapted, modified, scrapped and substituted, or otherwise exploited, debated, deliberated, discussed, disputed. No one should consider it "finished," in other words. But without the imagistic stimulus such a model provides for a governing philosophical base, I submit that we will continue to make beginnings ad infinitum. Our premises about the composing process will remain fragmented, and practical strategies, productive though they may be in writing courses, will persist as unconnected pedagogical flashes of wisdom.
So I view the model which I have formulated and will introduce shortly as a deductive frame for investigation of the composing process. I hope it will function as a hypothetical promise. Others' intuitions may deny some of my theses; empirical data may contradict some of my conclusions. But we need to remind ourselves that productive research in any field proceeds exactly along those dialectical lines of inquiry. Perhaps our discipline is as ripe for recognizing that truth as linguistics was over twenty years ago.
We can advance toward the model by making two assertions. The subsequent discussions of each will clarify my major premises. 
1)
Reading is not simply the inverse of writing; or, to put it another way, a language user does not simply reverse gears when he switches from comprehension to production of the written word. If that were the case, we could conveniently invert, say, Goodman's model of the reading process in order to understand what it is that writers do. Yet obviously both reading and writing proceed from the same base of competence, and our understanding of one should help us to make insightful comments about the other. Fortunately, we have a rich but elegant body of research in reading from which an informed excursion into the composing process may be launched.
2) There is no model of language (or "what happens" when people communicate intentions and responses to one another) that satisfies everyone. But a number of formal accounts seem in accord with the intuitions of a majority of researchers who find such speculations "interesting" (to use the word as philosophers do), if we take reference to those accounts in subsequent research to mean just that. In applying two of the better known mechanisms to a theory of discourse or composition-the intention-response model of H. P. Grice and the speech act theory from the work of J. L. Austin4-I will necessarily leave some large gaps in a short essay where complete discussions of philosophical arguments are impossible. At any rate, the primary sources are easily available, and the language becomes technical only where a philosopher-writer would want to prove a point (already discussed at length) to other philosophers. But if the model should align with the reader's intuitions, so much the better.
We understand now that the reader's job cannot be described in her identifying letter by letter or word by word the half-inches of text which appear at the end of her nose in a sequential scanning of a line of print. Decoding or comprehending the meaning of any text at the rate of even 100 words per minute would be impossible by such a procedure. The reader's short-term memory could not store all the features of the graphic medium and, at the same time, allow interpretive room for the "sense" of what she is seeing. Rather, any competent reader "picks up graphic cues, guided by constraints set up through prior choices, his language knowledge, his cognitive styles, and strategies he has learned."5 He then predicts what the text will say, tests the prediction by matching his choices with the graphic cues, and finally confirms his prediction by accepting the semantic match of his "choice" and the graphic and syntactic cues. Or if her projected meaning does not match the prior choices realized as context and syntax, she disconfirms and begins the cycle over again from the beginning. Reading, as Goodman puts it, is a psycholinguistic guessing game, and a good deal of the guessing involves the reader's anticipating the writer's intention or meaning. To illustrate: A reader can comprehend the entire message of a syntactic unit before she has read every word, as in the following sentences: fHe winds his watch while the children read.
I read yesterday that the winds would be blowing. These sentences must be comprehended in their entirety before the reader has decoded every word in a left to right sequence. Otherwise, "winds" and "read" might have been mispronounced if the sentences were read aloud, given another semantic value if read silently, misunderstood in both cases. Reading, thus, is hardly a passive exercise, a ventriloquism for the literate. The reader must be credited with forming presuppositions which the process of reading both stimulates and satisfies. On a higher level, we can view the discrete parts of discourse, to paraphrase Kenneth Burke, as an arousing and fulfillment of desires, the interrelationships of which constitute the rhetorical act. The point is, the reader is a full-fledged partner in this activity. If the writing of the discourse and the reading of it are successful, both participants will meet not on the page, but in the deep structure of meaning, the underlying form of discourse. Such a notion makes sense insofar as a reader may paraphrase a text, summarize it, supply missing transitions, "correct" it, make any number of adjustments to the text while preserving the semantic intention of the writer. In some cases, the adjustments may even enhance or clarify the writer's representation of meaning, as in the criticism offered in a writing workshop or teacher-student conference.
Introducing a term like semantic intention fits reading theory into a larger philosophical context. The history of semantics, even its recent history, is so orchestrally rich that my caveat (and apology) above concerning the necessarily brief discussions of complex arguments bears repeating. I will be arbitrary, in order to be brief, in my choice of sources and how they ultimately connect with one another. 6 In 1958, H. P. Grice proposed a mechanism for describing language which works like this: A intends to bring about a response on the part of B by getting B to recognize A's intention; B does recognize A's intention to bring about that response and is thereby given some sort of reason to respond just as A intended. Now the key words of that description (intention, response, recognition, reason) satisfy so well the philosophical and rhetorical quarrels incited by such other words as "truthvalue," "meaning" (in the empiricist's sense), or "analycity," that Grice's mechanism has worn well in the two decades since he first offered it for inspection, the busiest, most revolutionary period in the history of our study of language.
Certainly but, like the filament of the spider betrayed by the shift of a sunbeam, it is nevertheless there. If readers (nderstand writers' meanings, intentions, purposes because they are able to reckon intuitively with writers' implicit underlying forms, then writers must intuitively rely on readers being able to do exactly that. Otherwise, as in the case for performative values sketched above, every declarative sentence that we read would be preceded by a performative clause explicitly announcing the intention to which we are to respond. Therefore, we can assume that the greater part of the rules of discourse are applied unconsciously, yet reader and writer "connect" in that expert, tacit knowledge of the rules of language.
Clearly the writer cannot be thought of as simply engaged in transposing some inviolable thought into words via the written medium. She must presuppose an addressee who will have a context ready for the subject matter, a "linguistic" context as well as a "conceptual" frame of knowledge. And given the discussion above, "presupposing an addressee" amounts to something quite distinct from classical claims for pathos. In encoding a message which the writer believes will eventually be reconstructed by a reader, she must make some hypotheses about the reader's reconstruction of that message. In effect, the writer will engage in a variation of the intention-response exchange by "standing in" for the addressee, by completing by proxy the intention-response mechanism.
By and large, we can see now how the methods and techniques for discovering "subject matter," the whole art of rhetorical invention, act as a formalized recognition of "responses" in the variation of intention-response which we call rhetoric. ethos (admit, appoint, authorize, bequeath,  command, condemn, confess, demand, deny, empower, excommunicate, grant, instruct, order, pledge, pronounce,  require, sentence, vow) or logos (accede, assert, cede, challenge, claim, concede, declare, doubt, enquire, inform, offer,  report) . The correspondences may mark Aristotle's division as intuitively valid or the current theory as conservatively framed; either way, rhetoric can be viewed as an inherent system which is "discoverable," rather than as a set of rules imposed from without. See Dorothy Augustine and W. Ross Winterowd, "Speech Acts and the Sources of Composition," forthcoming. On a more particular level, every one of the twenty-eight topics listed in Book II of the Rhetoric may be considered abstractions, not of the way people "think" within a system of logic, but of how they "cooperate" in the hypothetical dialogue of rhetoric. Such inventional procedures as topics, then, are not so much an aid in discovering "subject matter" as it is conventionally understood, as they are a tool for expressing the beliefs and the attitudes of the participants in the hypothetical dialogue. Like reading, then, writing is a psycholinguistic guessing game. Like the reader, one who is engaged in the composing process "concentrates his total prior experience and learning on the task, drawing on his experience and the concepts he has attained as well as the language competence he has achieved."9 As a user of language, he constructs a mechanism for communicating his intentions in the absence of immediate cues in the form of spoken responses which may help him to define the audience. The competent writer invents the reader. Or, to put it another way, she invents her subject matter-she analyzes what she knows and discovers what she needs to know---on the basis of what she is able to project about a probable, existential exchange of intention(s) and response(s) between herself and some other "self."
Responses (or
So the beginning of the rhetorical speech act is the intention to bring about a response from a probable audience, not the introduction of the first grapheme or word. In short, the writer's job is to compose the tacit presuppositions which he and the reader bring to their present and future understanding of each other and the subject matter which is being communicated.'0 That the writer has generalized the rules of conversation so that the dynamics of intention-response obtain in written 12Lyons states, for example, that "the logical calculi constructed by mathematicians and logicians have been strongly influenced by the grammatical structure of particular languages and cannot therefore be regarded as independent ideal systems by reference to which language can be judged." (Semantics, 1, 139) .
13The terms "long-term memory" and "short-term memory" are nearly self-explanatory. "Mediumterm memory," to be used shortly in laying out the model, may be understood as the storing of information for longer than immediate but less than permanent use. A familiar example of the duration of medium-term memory would be our returning to a piece of writing after the elapse of some days or weeks, noticing a certain tone or attitude sustained throughout, and wondering about the particular ratio of choices leading to a style or form which is, on a second approach, rejected out of hand. and others intuitions, the first hurdle that any linguistic model must pass, and have found it to be, in the linguists' terms "psychologically real."14
